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INTEREST DEDUCTION FOR INDIVIDUALS: REVIEW AND UPDATE
by
EDWARD SCHNEE*
Individuals are permitted to deduct certain listed itemized deductions in
computing their taxable income. One of the most important is interest ex-
pense.I Although neither the Code or the Regulations define the term "inter-
est," it is generally considered to be the amount paid for the use or forbearance
of money. It does not include payments to the lender for services rendered.
These expenditures are capitalized and, where applicable, amortized over the
life of the loan. 2
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 severely limited this deduction by enact-
ing I.R.C. § 163(h) which disallowed the deduction for all personal interest.
This term includes all interest paid by an individual except if it is:
1) interest from a trade or business;
2) investment interest;
3) interest deducted in calculating a passive activity's income or loss;
4) qualified residence interest, or
5) interest on installment payments of the unified transfer tax under
sections 6163 or 6166.
The amount of qualified residence interest is further limited by I.R.C. § 56(b)
for taxpayers subject to the alternative minimum tax.
This article will review the current cases and rulings involving business,
investment and qualified residence interest. It will point out areas of uncer-
tainty as well as planning opportunities and pitfalls.
A. Interest Expense
As previously mentioned, section 163(h) limits the deduction for inter-
est expense by individuals. Before this limitation and its exceptions can be
applied, the taxpayer must determine the type of interest expense that was
incurred. Reg. § 1. 163-8T provides the rules for allocating interest expenses
for purposes of the limitations.
Reg. § 1.163-8T(a)(3) states that, in general, interest expense is allocated
in the same manner as the associated debt. The debt is allocated by tracing the
debt to the specific expenditures funded by the debt. The allocation is made
when the loan proceeds are first expended. The allocation remains until the
debt is repaid or reallocated. Reallocation will occur on the sale of an asset
acquired by the debt. The reallocation traces the use of the proceeds from the
* Professor of Accounting, Culverhouse School of Accountancy
1. I.R.C. § 143 (1988).
2. See Goodwin v. Commissioner, 75 TC 424 (1980) aff'd, 691 F.2d 490 (3d. Cir. 1982).
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sale. Reallocation will also occur on the change in character of the first ex-
penditure. For example, reallocation is necessary where the activity involved
is no longer a passive activity. 3
There is one major exception to the general allocation rule. Qualified
residence interest is calculated and allowed as a deduction without regard to
the allocation of the debt proceeds.4
In addition to determining the allocation of the interest, the taxpayer
must be able to prove that she actually paid the interest. Since most individu-
als are on the cash method, this usually requires an actual cash expenditure.
Interest withheld by the lender (i.e. a discounted loan) is not considered paid
until the loan is repaid.' If the taxpayer incurs a second debt to repay an ex-
isting debt, the interest on the first debt may or may not be considered paid.6
If the second loan is from a different creditor, the first loan and interest are
considered paid. When both loans are from the same creditor, the taxpayer has
to prove that she had exercised unrestricted control over the funds to be treated
as having repaid the first loan. Otherwise, the taxpayer will be denied the
deduction for interest and any allowable fees on the basis of failure to have
actually paid the expense.
B. Business Interest
As previously stated, § 163(h) contains an exception to the disallowance
of personal interest expense deductions for interest allocable to a trade or
business. The Code excludes from the definition of trade or business for
purposes of this section the performance of services as an employee. It is not
surprising, therefore, that the I.R.S has ruled that interest on student loans is
personal, non-deductible interest.7 Although the ruling does not address the
issue, the denial of the deduction should also apply to student loans incurred
to pay for deductible employee education expenditures. Although it is pos-
sible for a taxpayer in this situation to argue that under the "origin of the
claim" doctrine the deduction should be considered as part of her education
and therefore allowable as part of an education expense deduction, it is more
likely that the specific Code provision denying interest associated with em-
ployment will prohibit the deduction.
Without mentioning it specifically, the I.R.S. used the "origin of the
claim" doctrine in this manner against a taxpayer in a recent Tax Court case.
3. Temp. Reg. § 1.163-8T(j).
4. Temp. Reg. § 1.163-8T(m)(3).
5. Rubnitz v. Commissioner, 67 TC 621 (1977).
6. For a more complete discussion of this issue with citations, see Rutland v. Commissioner,
79 TC 751 (1982).
7. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88 -22- 020 (March 1, 1988).
8. McKay v. Commissioner, 102 TC 465 (1994).
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The case dealt with a lawsuit in which the taxpayer sued his former employer
for wrongful discharge, breach of his employment contract, RICO violations,
and punitive damages. In order to pay his legal expenses, he was forced-to bor-
row money. He deducted the interest as business interest. The Tax Court
agreed with the I.R.S. that the lawsuit arose out of his business of being an em-
ployee. As such, the court held that the expense was personal interest. In other
words, the "origin of the claim" was the taxpayer's employment. Therefore,
the suit relates to employment and is covered by the Code prohibition against
deduction of personal interest. All interest associated with employment is
likely to be non-deductible.
The denial of interest expense related to employment could cause diffi-
culty in an entirely different line of cases. For years, taxpayers who purchased
stock in, or loaned money to, a corporation to protect their employment have
argued that losses and bad debts associated with the stock purchases and loans
were business losses and therefore fully deductible.9 To the extent taxpayers
are successful with this argument, any interest paid to borrow the money used
to buy the stock or to make the loan would be non-deductible interest because
it relates to employment.
Recently, the I.R.S. addressed this issue in Rev. Rul. 93-68.10 Accord-
ing to this ruling, the interest from a loan to purchase stock is investment
interest, and its deductibility is limited accordingly. The ruling states that this
conclusion applies regardless of the taxpayer's motive in purchasing the
stock.
Although the ruling limits deductibility of the interest, it may be viewed
as favorable to the taxpayer employee. If the Service had concluded that
motive was relevant, then anytime there is a dominant business motive, the
interest would be completely non-deductible. Since the business motive
would be protection of employment, the prohibition against employee inter-
est would apply. Rev. Rul. 93-68 eliminates the possibility that the Service
will attempt to deny a deduction for interest for stock purchases when the
shareholder is also an employee of the corporation.
1. Interest on Tax Deficiencies
The Code allows individuals to deduct business interest unless it is re-
lated to employment. Reg. § 1.163-9T excludes from the definition of busi-
ness interest that which arises on tax deficiencies and on loans to pay tax
deficiencies regardless of the source of the income generating the tax. An
example in the regulations illustrates this exclusion for a tax deficiency result-
ing from an understatement of S corporation income. The example states that
9. See, e.g. Miller v. Commissioner, 70 TC 448 (1978) (argueing for business rather than
investment interest).
10. 1993-2 CB 72.
1996]
3
Schnee: Interest Deductions for Individuals
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1996
AKRON TAX JOURNAL
the same result would occur if the income was from a sole proprietorship.
Interest paid on certain taxes is exempt from this exclusion." These
taxes include sales and excise taxes incurred in a business, taxes paid by an
S corporation relating to a prior C corporation year, and taxes paid by a trans-
feree under I.R.C. § 6901. These regulations have resulted in several court
cases.
In Miller v. United States, 2 a District Court considered whether an indi-
vidual could deduct the interest on a tax deficiency arising out of a sole pro-
prietorship. The court first considered the validity of the applicable regula-
tions. It opened its analysis with the observation that, prior to 1986, the courts
had uniformly held the interest expense in dispute was deductible for Adjusted
Gross Income under I.R.C. § 62(a)(1). The court noted that the language in
§ 163(h)(2)(A) is similar to the language in I.R.C. § 162 and 62. Since these
latter sections weren't changed by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the implica-
tion exists that the prior cases are still applicable. This conclusion is consis-
tent with the legislative history. The Conference Report states, "personal
interest also generally includes interest on tax deficiencies."' 3 According to
the court, the committee would not have included the word "generally" unless
there were occasions when the interest was not personal interest. The court
pointed out that the first occasion that this interest was stated to be personal
at all times was in the Report of the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation.
Since this bluebook is a post enactment explanation, it is not on par with the
legislative history. Finally, the court cited an article by two law experts that
also concluded that the bluebook goes beyond the language of the Code. The
court, therefore, concluded that Reg. § 1.163-9T(b)(2)(A) was overly broad
and invalid.
The Milller court then addressed the issue as to whether the interest
expense met the test for deductibility under § 162. According to the court, the
fact that the regulation was held invalid does not make all interest associated
with a sole proprietorship deductible. Rather, its deduction is permitted pro-
vided the taxpayer can prove that it was an ordinary and necessary expense as
defined in § 162.
The Miller court considered Commissioner v. Polk4 , the seminal case on
the deductibility of interest. In that case, the deficiency was the result of a
valuation dispute in the taxpayer's business of raising and producing live-
stock. Based on its review of Polk and other cases cited by the taxpayer, the
Miller court concluded:
11. Temp. Reg. § 1.163-9 T(b)(2)(iii).
12. 841 F. Supp. 305, (D.N.D. 1993).
13. Id. at 309.
14. 276 F.2d 601 (10th Cir. 1960).
[Vol. 12
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Unless the taxpayer's error which caused the underlying income tax de-
ficiency is ordinarily and necessarily to be expected in the taxpayer's type
of business, interest on a deficiency assignment of additional tax is not
properly considered ordinary or necessary to the operation of taxpayer's
business, and therefore may not be deducted.' 5
Applying the standard from Polk, the Miller court concluded that the
expense was not ordinary or necessary, since it was the result of an improper
deferral scheme. There was no real issue in dispute. Professionals would not
disagree over the proper treatment of the disputed income in Miller. There-
fore the interest expense was not ordinary and necessary. The final result was
that the interest was personal and nondeductible.
Although the taxpayer lost in Miller, the decision leaves open the pos-
sibility of a deduction. However, the case places the burden of proof with the
taxpayer to prove that there was a sufficient disagreement as to the proper tax
treatment to raise the expense to the level of ordinary and necessary. It may
be impossible for the taxpayer to meet this burden: in True v. United States, 6
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, the same circuit that decided Polk, stated
in a footnote:
We believe, as did the panel presiding in Polk, that Polk settled a unique
controversy. The parties have not presented any facts nor can we imag-
ine another situation in which the penalty interest would be an ordinary
and necessary expense of operating a trade or business.7
Given the complexity of modern business and of the Internal Revenue Code
itself, the footnoted statement of the Tenth Circuit seems unreasonable if the
standard is whether there exists an honest disagreement by qualified profes-
sionals. There is simply too much litigation and too much discussion of the
need to simplify the law to assume that real differences of opinion do not exist.
However, if the courts apply the aforementioned statement, or draw a similar
conclusion, to future cases, all tax deficiency interest will, in fact, be held to
be personal and non-deductible, thereby upholding the conclusion of the ques-
tioned regulation despite its invalidity.
The issue of deficiency interest was recently litigated in Redlark.'8
Taxpayer paid and deducted interest from a deficiency arising from account-
ing errors in the application of the cash and accrual methods. The Tax Court
concluded that the temporary regulation was invalid and that the interest met
the definition of an ordinary and necessary expense based on Polk. The court
interpreted the quoted statement from Miller as simply reemphasizing the
15. Miller v. United States, 1994 WL 714069 at *2.
16. 35 F.3d 574 (10th Cir. 1994).
17. Id.
18. Redlark v. Commissioner, 106 TC 2, (1996).
19961
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requirement that the interest be a business deduction and not a per se denial
of all deficiency interest deductions.
The question of the deductibility of deficiency interest in a partnership
context was raised in True.' 9 The taxpayer deducted the interest on a defi-
ciency arising out of adjustments to income reported as partners and S corpo-
ration shareholders. The Service denied the deduction and the District Court
ruled for the Service. 21 In reviewing the background of the case, the District
Court stated:
The IRS contends that although an interest payment on tax deficiencies is
generally viewed as an above the line business expense for sole
proprietorships and C corporations, such payments are not business ex-
penses for partnerships and S corporations, because these latter forms of
business organization have no duty to pay income tax. 2
The denial of the deduction for partners and S corporation shareholders fol-
lows directly from Reg. § 1. 163-9T. The statement that the IRS contends that
interest on deficiencies of sole proprietorships are business expenses conflicts
with the position taken by the Treasury in the previously discussed cases.
Perhaps the Service is litigating this issue as to sole proprietors solely because
the temporary regulations prohibit the deduction, however they recognize that
the majority of precedent would allow the deduction, provided the deficiency
is the result of an honest disagreement as to the tax treatment of the contested
item.
The court states that the issue raised in True is really whether to apply
the "entity" or the "aggregate" approach to partnership taxation. The court
concludes that the entity approach is the correct approach. As support for the
conclusion that the interest is personal under the entity approach, the court
cites United States v. Basye.2 2 The partnership is a separate entity from its
partners, and, therefore, the partnership alone would be entitled to the deduc-
tion since it is the business' expense. It is not an expense of the partners. On
the other hand, since a partnership does not pay tax, it cannot incur any ex-
penses related to the tax. The court recognizes that their conclusion results
in no deduction, either at the entity or partner level, for the expense. Since the
taxpayer selected the form of business, she must bear the consequences of her
choice - in this case, the loss of a deduction. The court's conclusion as it
relates to partnerships is open to question.
The issue addressed by the Supreme Court in Basye is whether income
19. True v. United States, No. 91-CV-1004-J, 1993 WL 379417 (D. Wyo. 1993), aff'd, 35
F. 3d 574 (10th Cir. 1994).
20. Id.
21. Id. at *1.
22. 410 US 441, (1973).
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earned by a partnership should be included in partnership income even though
it was paid directly to the partners. The Court concluded that under the en-
tity approach the partnership must report the income.
The Court cited I.R.C. § 703 for the requirement that a partnership must
compute its taxable income similarly to an individual. The Court then states:
For this purpose [computing income], then, the partnership is regarded as
an independently recognizable entity apart from the aggregate of its part-
ners. Once its income is ascertained and reported, its existence may be
disregarded since each partner must pay a tax on a portion of the total
income as if the partnership were merely an agent or conduit through
which the income passed.2 3
In other words, a partnership is an entity solely for purposes of computing its
income. For all other purposes, it is an aggregate of its partners. Given this
interpretation of Basye, it is possible to argue that a partner is in fact engaged
in a trade or business to the extent she reports income. Thus, interest paid on
a deficiency resulting from this reported business income should be deduct-
ible provided it meets the ordinary and necessary test of § 162.
A partner can also argue that she should be treated as engaged in the
business of the partnership based on I.R.C. § 1402. This section requires each
partner to report and pay self-employment tax on her share of partnership
income whether or not distributed. Under Reg. § 1.1402(a)(1)(b), the amount
of net earnings from self employment for a partner includes any payment
"... for the use of capital by the partnership." The inclusion of guaranteed
payments for capital equates a partner with a sole proprietor. The total income
of the business, that based on both services and capital, is subject to self
employment tax. If a partnership were a separate entity from the partners, the
income from the use of capital should not be self-employment income, but
portfolio income similar to interest earned on loans. Since the regulations
treat the total income as earned, it follows that the partner is being treated as
engaged in the business of the partnership. Under this approach, the regula-
tions employ the aggregate theory.
This argument applies to partnerships, but not to S corporations. Section
1402 does not include the undistributed income of an S corporation in self-
employment income. In fact, I.R.C. § 1371 applies the corporate rules of
Subchapter C, not the partnership rules of Subchapter K, to S corporations. In
other words, an S corporation is an entity separate from its shareholders,
except in the case of the waiver of the corporate level tax.
Although it can be argued that partners should be entitled to deficiency
interest deductions, the deduction is denied by both the Regulations and case
law. A taxpayer claiming this deduction should be prepared to argue its merits
23. Id. at 447.
1996]
7
Schnee: Interest Deductions for Individuals
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1996
AKRON TAX JOURNAL
in litigation.
Reg. § 1.163-9T(b)(2)(i)(C) states that personal interest includes any
interest paid by a trust, an S corporation, or any other pass-through entity on
the underpayment of taxes or loans to pay taxes. Therefore, these amounts
would be non-deductible.
The Service has privately ruled that this regulation also applies to es-
tates. 14 The taxpayer in the ruling request stated that the estate borrowed
money to pay taxes and administrative costs to prevent the sale of assets at
depressed prices. The estate requested a ruling allowing the deduction for
estate income tax purposes, provided it filed the requisite statement giving up
the estate tax deduction. The Service ruled that the estate could not claim an
income tax deduction for the interest. Even though the loan was necessary to
avoid a "fire sale" of estate assets, the loan was still to pay taxes, and there-
fore the interest is non-deductible personal interest. However, the ruling goes
on to state that to the extent the estate can prove that loan was reasonable and
necessary to the administration of the estate, the interest can be deducted on
the estate tax return as an administration expense pursuant to Rev. Rul. 84-
75 .25
This ruling confirms the Service's position that interest to pay taxes is
non-deductible personal interest. The Service has ruled privately that there
is an exception to this rule for interest by a transferee for underpayments of
taxes relating to a C corporation. In this ruling, a corporation liquidated and
distributed its assets to a trust in December, 1990. The trust requested that the
Service examine the tax returns for 1988, 1989 and 1990. In 1991, the agent
and the trustee reached an agreement that the trust owed $131,992 in taxes,
$50,108 in interest and $881 in penalties. The taxpayer requested rulings on
the treatment of the different items assessed.
The ruling held that the $131,992 in taxes and $881 in penalty fees are
long-term capital losses. This conclusion is based onArrowsmith v. Commis-
sioner,26 Rev. Rul. 72-137,27 and Johnson.28 Since these two items are contin-
gent liabilities of the corporation, they are really adjustments to the prior
capital gain reported on the corporate liquidation under I.R.C. § 331. Al-
though this conclusion appears to equate the shareholder who paid these
amounts with a shareholder of another corporation that received fewer assets
because the corporation paid its liability before liquidation, the taxpayer is not
made completely whole. The shareholder had to pre-pay the tax on the excess
reported capital gain. In addition, the capital loss might not be completely
24. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-49-011 (Sept. 9, 1994).
25. 1984-1 CB 193.
26. 344 U.S. 6 (1952).
27. 1972-1 CB 101.
28. Johnson v. Commissioner, 19 TC 465, Acq. 1953-2 CB 5.
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deductible in the year of payment. Due to the $3,000 limit on deductibility of
capital losses, some of the loss may not be deductible until future years. Based
on time value of money principles, the taxpayer will be worse off than if the
corporation had paid the liability. On the other hand, the capital loss can
offset up to $3,000 of ordinary income. To the extent that the capital gain tax
rate is less than the ordinary income tax rate, the shareholder receives a ben-
efit from the payment of the liability. In most cases, the prepayment of taxes
will be a greater detriment than the benefit gained from the rate differential.
The ruling also discussed the timing and classification of the $50,108 of
interest paid. The timing of the deduction is the easier question. In Rev. Rul.
70-560,29 the Service ruled that an accrual basis taxpayer should deduct inter-
est on a tax deficiency in the year that the deficiency is determined or agreed.
The Service applied this ruling to the trust to conclude that the interest was
accrued in 1991, the year of the agreement. It would appear that if the tax-
payer was a cash basis taxpayer, the amounts would be deductible in the year
paid.
The classification of the interest was more difficult. Based on the tem-
porary regulation and on Johnson3' decision, the Ruling concluded that the in-
terest is not non-deductible personal interest. However, the ruling notes that
part of the interest had accrued before the liquidation, and part had accrued
after the liquidation. The part that accrued before the liquidation is really a
contingent liability of the corporation and, as in the case of the other contin-
gent liabilities, will generate a long-term capital loss on payment. The part
that accrues after liquidation is interest and would be deductible under the
exception in the temporary regulation. The Ruling treats all the corporate li-
abilities consistently and logically. The end result, however, is to restrict the
deduction of transferee interest and the usefulness of the exception. The clas-
sification of that part of the interest that accrued before liquidation as a capital
loss, although not as beneficial as the taxpayer had requested, is still more
beneficial than if it had been classified as non-deductible personal interest.
2. Pass-Through Entities
The entity/aggregate dichotomy associated with partnerships and S
corporations results in additional complications when determining the deduct-
ibility of interest incurred by the entity or related to the purchase of the entity.
To resolve some of these questions, the Service has issued some guidance.
Although most of the published guidance involves partnerships and S corpo-
rations, the rules also apply to a trust in which a taxpayer is treated as the
owner under the grantor trust rules.31
29. 1970-2 CB 37.
30. Johnson, 19 TC at 468.
31. See, e.g. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-31-022 (May 7, 1990).
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One question addressed by the Service is the characterization of inter-
est expense incurred by a pass-through entity that is allocable to an owner.
This is covered by Reg. § 1.163-8T. Under this regulation, the interest ex-
pense follows the debt and the debt is allocated by tracing the disbursements
of the debt proceeds. Detailed rules are provided for situations in which the
tracing of the proceeds is unclear. In general, if the debt proceeds are used in
the business, the interest is business interest that is fully deductible by the
owner. If the owner does not materially participate in the business, the interest
is part of the passive income/loss computation. If the proceeds were issued
to purchase investment assets, the interest is investment interest limited by
§ 163(d).
The division of assets owned by a pass-through entity into business and
investment assets is relatively straightforward. However, there is one unex-
pected result. Section 163(d)(5)(A) states that investment property includes
property described in I.R.C. § 469(e)(1). This section provides that invest-
ment (portfolio) income is not earned in a trade or business and therefore is
not part of a passive loss. It specifically includes in portfolio income inter-
est earned on invested working capital. Since working capital generates
portfolio income, it is an asset not used in a trade or business. As a result,
interest expense to provide working capital for a pass-through entity will
be classified as investment interest and not business interest. This part of the
pass-through interest expense will be limited by § 163(d).32 From a planning
perspective, it would be better to use contributed capital for working capital
and borrowed funds to purchase business assets.
The regulations describe the allocation methodology for interest expense
incurred by a pass-through entity. They do not discuss the interest on a loan
to purchase an interest in a pass-through entity. However, the Service ad-
dressed this issue in Notice 89-35. It provides that the interest incurred to
purchase an interest in an entity will be allocated based on the assets within
the entity. This allocation can be done using any reasonable method. The
Notice provides that the normal allocation methods include pro-rata alloca-
tions based on fair market value or book value, each reduced by entity debt
allocated to the assets. To be a reasonable method, it must be used consis-
tently each year.
The allocation of interest on a loan to make a capital contribution to the
entity or purchase an interest in the entity where the entity receives the pro-
ceeds can be different from the previous allocation. In addition to the pro-rata
allocation previously discussed, taxpayers can use actual tracing of the pro-
ceeds as if the contribution was a loan made to the entity. Again, the method
should be applied consistently from year to year.
32. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-15-013 (Jan. 7, 1992).
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The method of allocation selected will result in different amounts of
deductible interest. The method that provides the largest deduction will vary
depending on the relationship of value to basis. No one method will always
be superior. A taxpayer should compare the various alternatives before select-
ing the method to be used.
Two additional questions can arise involving business interest. The first
involves the assumption of debt. If the owner of a business assumes a debt of
that business, what is the proposed characterization of the interest expense?
Does the reason for the assumption change the result? The Service addressed
these questions in a Private Letter Ruling concerning the assumption of an
S corporation's debt by its shareholders. 33 The Service analyzed the questions
using the interest allocation regulations. Under Reg. § 1.163-8T, interest is
allocated at the time the expenditure is made. It is reallocated on the occur-
rence of specific events. This reallocation occurs on the earlier of (1) the
reinvestment of the proceeds of the sale of the assets acquired with the loan
proceeds, or (2) the change in the character of the first expenditure. The as-
sumption of the debt is not covered by the reallocation rules. Therefore, the
assumption does not change the allocation. If the interest expense to the S
corporation would have been business interest then it would remain business
interest following the assumption. If it was investment interest it remains
investment interest. The assumption has no effect on the characterization.
Therefore, if it were included in taxpayer's passive loss before the assump-
tion, it will be included in the passive loss after the assumption. The fact that
the assumption does not change the classification of the interest does not mean
that the assumption has no other tax consequences. For example, the assump-
tion might change the taxpayer's basis in the entity. This will change the limit
on the deduction of an allocated loss and might affect the taxation of a distri-
bution. These results are separate from the characterization of the interest
expense issue.
Another question is the proper classification of a guaranteed payment to
a partner for use of capital. According to I.R.C. § 707(c), a guaranteed pay-
ment is one that is calculated without regard to the partnership income. These
amounts are considered paid to a non-partner, but only for purposes of § 61
and § 162. 31 Since a guaranteed payment for use of capital is in the nature of
interest, the issue arises as to whether this expenditure is interest expense and
therefore subject to the limits of § 163. It is the Treasury's position that these
payments are not interest expense, and are, therefore, not subject to § 163. 31
This conclusion is based in part on the fact that § 707(c) refers to § 162 and
not § 163. More importantly, § 707(c) creates a fictional debt, not a real li-
ability, and that this fiction is solely for purposes of § 162. In other words, the
33. Sept. 14, 1989.
34. Deductibility is subject to the capitalization rules of § 263.
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fiction is used to impose an ordinary and necessary standard on the deductibil-
ity of the payment rather than to reclassify the payment as interest.
This conclusion is interesting because the very same guaranteed pay-
ments which are deductible without regard to § 163 are, in the Treasury's
opinion, interest income to the recipient.3 6 This conclusion is based on the
legislative history of § 707(c), and the fact that § 61(a)(4) lists interest. Since
§ 707(c) refers to § 61(a), it would apply to all the paragraphs within this
subsection.
The Treasury does not address the question of the type of interest in-
come. Specifically, is it investment income which will increase the amount
of investment interest expense deductible under § 163(d)? Since the
Treasury's position is to divorce the tax treatment of the recipient from that
of the payor, the classification should be based solely on the recipient. At this
level, it is interest received for an investment in an entity. This view would
place the interest well within the definition of investment income.
Assuming these conclusions are upheld, there appears to be a small but
useful planning opportunity available to partnerships. They should consider
paying guaranteed payments for use of capital. This will generate investment
income for the partner, which might increase her interest expense deduction
without creating interest expense limited by § 163. However, this opportu-
nity is limited. To the extent that the partners make excess contributions over
what is needed by the entity, the new anti-abuse regulations under I.R.C. § 701
can be used to deny the taxpayer her intended benefit.
C. Investment Interest
Investment interest is exempted from the denial of the deduction of
personal interest. The amount of investment interest that is deductible in any
year is limited by § 163(d).
Pursuant to § 163(d), the amount of investment interest deductible each
year is limited to the amount of net investment income reported in that year.37
Investment interest expense in excess of the amount deductible is carried
forward and treated as paid in the succeeding year. This results in an unlim-
ited carryforward of excess investment interest.
1. Investment Interest Expense
Investment interest expense is defined as interest paid on a debt allocated
to property held for investment.3 Specifically excluded from this definition
is interest qualifying as residence interest and interest included in computing
35. GCM 36702 (Apr. 12, 1976) and GCM 38133 (Oct. 10, 1979).
36. Id.
37. Sec. 163(d)(1).
38. Sec. 163 (d)(3)(A).
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passive income or loss.3 9
Property held for investment is property that generates portfolio income
such as interest and dividends. Thus, stocks and bonds are investment prop-
erty. It is immaterial if the stock was purchased to protect taxpayer's employ-
ment40 or to become a member of a cooperative.4 The pre-1986 cases which
examined the taxpayer's motive are no longer applicable since the law was
changed to include a specific definition of investment property which does not
mention intent. 2
Generally, an investment in real estate will produce either business or
passive income. Therefore, any related interest is excluded from the defini-
tion of investment interest. However, if the real estate activity is insufficient
to qualify as a business, then the real estate is an investment activity and all
related interest is investment interest. Again, it is immaterial if the real estate
was purchased with the intent to form a business. The activities must actually
constitute a business to avoid investment classification.43
2. Net Investment Income
Net investment income is the excess of investment income over related
investment expenses.4 4 Investment income is the sum of:
1. gross income from properties held for investment;
2. the excess of the gains from disposition of investment property over
the net capital gain from such dispositions; and
3. the amount of the net capital gain from disposition of investment
property elected by the taxpayer.
Property held for investment includes property which produces income de-
scribed in § 469(e)(1) and any interest in an activity involving a trade or
business which is not a passive activity and in which the taxpayer does not
materially participate. 5 Section 469(e)(1) describes portfolio income, which
includes interest, dividends, annuities, royalties not derived in the ordinary
course of business and gains from the disposition of property producing these
items of income. These definitions do not mention intent. Similarly, there is
no mention of property producing investment interest expense. As a result,
there is no symmetry between investment interest income and investment
interest expense as well as the inclusion in investment income of unexpected
items. For example, the Service has ruled that interest on a tax refund is in-
39. Sec. 163(d)(3)(B).
40. Rev. Rul 93-68, 1993-2 CB 72.
41. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-09-004 (Oct. 31, 1991).
42. Id.
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vestment income even though interest on a tax deficiency is personal interest
and tax refunds are not normally considered investment property.46 It is im-
portant to keep this expansive definition in mind when calculating investment
income.
The Tax Reform Act of 1993 changed the definition of investment in-
come. For any year after 1992, investment income includes only that part of
a taxpayer's net long-term capital gain from the disposition of investment
property that she elects.47 Any amount included in investment income is ex-
cluded from the provision limiting the tax rate applied to capital gains.48 Since
the inclusion of a capital gain in investment income is voluntary, the taxpayer
must decide if the current deduction of the extra interest offsets the loss of the
reduced capital gain tax rate. For a taxpayer in the 39.6% bracket who could
use the investment interest expense carryover the following year, the election
would be profitable if she could earn over 40% after-tax on the tax savings in
the current year. The longer the deferral in the use of the carryover, the lower
is the required rate of return. However, unless the carryover will be deferred
for a very long-time, the taxpayer will probably be better off not electing to
include any capital gains in investment income based on the high required rate
of return to break-even from the election.
For years before 1987, taxpayers and the IRS disagreed as to the amount
of the interest expense carryover. For those years, § 163(d)(2) limited the
carryovers to the amount disallowed solely by § 163. Therefore, if the deduc-
tion was limited because the taxpayer had insufficient taxable income, the
Service's position was that no carryover was allowed. The issue was litigated
several times and the IRS lost each time.49 The I.R.S. eventually conceded de-
feat in a 1995 Revenue Ruling." For all years, whether before or after 1986,
taxpayers can carryover the excess of their investment interest expense over
their investment income without regard to their taxable income. This should
finally put this issue to rest.
D. Qualified Residence Interest
One of the most important exceptions to the disallowance of personal
interest is the deductibility of qualified residence interest. A taxpayer may
deduct the interest incurred on either acquisition debt or home equity debt.
"Acquisition debt" is a debt incurred to purchase, construct, or substan-
tially improve a qualified residence. It also includes a debt that refinances
qualified acquisition debt. The debt must be secured by the residence. In
46. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-07-005 (Oct. 27, 1992).
47. Sec. 163(d)(4)(B)(iii).
48. Sec. 1(h).
49. See Allbritton v. Commissioner, 37 F.3d 183 (5th Cir. 1994).
50. See Rev. Rul. 95-96, 1995-8 I.R.B. 4.
[Vol. 12
14
Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 12 [1996], Art. 4
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol12/iss1/4
INTEREST DEDUCTION FOR INDIVIDUALS
addition, the debt may not exceed $1,000,000 for any period. "Home equity
debt" is any other debt secured by a qualified residence. It cannot exceed the
lesser of the value of the residence reduced by the acquisition debt or
$100,000.
1. Qualified Residence
A qualified residence means the principal residence of the taxpayer and
one other residence selected by the taxpayer. The term principal residence has
the same definition for this purpose as it does for purposes of I.R.C. § 1034,
and a second residence has the same fourteen day minimum personal use
requirement as contained in I.R.C. § 280A(d)(1).
2. Principal Residence
The Code does not define the term "principal residence." The regula-
tions provide that the determination is based on all of the facts and circum-
stances.5 Generally, the taxpayer must occupy and live in the residence.12 It
is possible for the taxpayer to move out of the residence while attempting to
sell it without changing its classification.53 In fact, the taxpayer can even rent
the residence while attempting to sell it without changing it's classification.54
The Service has privately ruled on an important aspect of interest to this
issue. In this Ruling, the taxpayers wished to acquire five acres of land con-
tiguous to their residence. The residence was located on a fifteen acre plot.
They planned to borrow money to purchase the additional land. The taxpay-
ers requested a ruling as to whether this additional land, if it met all the addi-
tional tests, could qualify as part of the residence, making the interest on the
debt deductible. The Ruling stated that the question of purchasing additional
property was one of first impression. However, in Bogley v. Commissioner55
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit allowed a taxpayer to obtain the
benefits of § 112, the predecessor to § 1034, on the sale of land contiguous to
the plot of land containing the taxpayer's principal residence following the
sale of the residence. The court reasoned that the entire property was part of
the taxpayer's residence, and as long as he didn't change the use of the re-
tained acreage, it remained part of the residence. Based on this rationale, the
letter ruling concluded that if the residence can be sold in two pieces, it can
be bought in two pieces. Thus, provided that the land purchased after the
residence is used as part of the residence, it will qualify as the taxpayer's prin-
cipal residence and any associated debt is qualified acquisition debt.
51. Reg. Sec. 1.1034-1(c)(3).
52. See Perry, TC Memo 1994-247 (U.S. Tax Ct. 1994).
53. Claphan v. Commissioner, 63 TC 505 (1975).
54. See Bolares v. Commissioner, 776 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1985) (considering five factors
where property is rented).
55. 263 F.2d 746 (4th Cir. 1959).
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Rev. Rul. 76-54156 contains facts similar to the ones in Bogley. This
ruling also permits § 1034 nonrecognition treatment for sale of land contigu-
ous to, and used as part of, a residence which was previously sold.
Since the I.R.S. cited Bogley in the above private letter ruling as author-
ity under § 163, even though it involves § 1034, taxpayers should be able to
rely on it and Rev. Rul. 76-541, another § 1034 ruling, as authority under
§ 163 to address a slightly different question. Taxpayers who are having dif-
ficulty selling their residence because of the amount of acreage attached
should be able to sell it in two parts without forfeiting the interest deduction
under § 163. In these cases, it is important not to change the use of the retained
land. It must remain for sale with the mortgage attached. If this is done, the
interest paid on the debt securing the retained land should qualify as deduct-
ible residential interest.
3. Second Residence
Section 163 allows an individual to deduct the interest paid on indebt-
edness for a principal residence and a second residence. According to Reg.
§ 1.163-10 T(p)(3), property will qualify as a second residence if it meets
three tests. They are:
1. The property is a residence as defined by regulation;
2. The property is used by the taxpayer as a residence; and
3. The property is elected by the taxpayer as the second residence.
Under the temporary regulations, "a residence generally includes a
house, condominium, mobile home, boat, or house trailer that contains sleep-
ing space and toilet and cooking facilities " '57 A residence does not include
personal property.58 In Garrison,59 the Tax Court concluded that a vacant lot
upon which taxpayer camped two weeks each year did not qualify as a second
residence. Alternatively, the Tax Court allowed the taxpayer to claim as a
second residence a building constructed on farm land that the taxpayer
owned.6" The structure met the definition of a residence and the other required
tests even though it was located on a working farm.
The second requirement is that the taxpayer use the property as a resi-
dence. According to the regulations, the property must qualify under
§ 280A(d) if it is rented during the year.61 If it is not rented at any time dur-
56. 1976-2 CB 241.
57. Temp. Reg. 1.163-1OT(p)(3)(ii).
58. Id.
59. Garrison v. Commissioner, TC Memo 1994-200 (U.S. Tax Ct. 1994), aff'd, 67 F.3d
299 (6th Cir. 1995).
60. Lawler v. Commissioner, TC Memo 1995-26.
61. Temp. Reg. 1.163-10T(p)(3)(iii).
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ing the year it is considered to be used as a residence by definition. 62 Section
280A(d) provides that a dwelling is used as a residence if the taxpayer uses
the property for personal purposes for the greater of fourteen days or ten per-
cent of the number of days rented during the year.
The third requirement is that the taxpayer elect to treat the property as
a second residence. Neither the Code nor the regulations elaborate with re-
spect to this requirement. Therefore, the Tax Court upheld the election
although it was made at the time a petition was filed with the court in a suit
disallowing the interest deduction. 63 Based on this decision, it appears that
taxpayers can make the election at any time and in any reasonable manner.
4. Acquisition Indebtedness
As previously stated, the debt must qualify as either acquisition debt or
home equity debt. To be acquisition debt, it must be debt incurred to either
acquire, construct, or substantially improve a residence. Further, it must be
secured by the residence.
To assist taxpayers in determining if the debt was used to acquire a resi-
dence, the I.R.S. issued Notice 88-74.64 According to this Notice, debt will be
assigned to home purchases based on the normal tracing rules of Reg. § 1.163-
8T. As an alternative to the tracing rules, the taxpayer can treat any debt
incurred within ninety days before or after the purchase of a residence as
residential debt to the extent of the purchase price of the home. If the home
is constructed or improved, this alternate rule is expanded to include expen-
ditures for up to twenty-four months prior to the date the debt is incurred. The
period after the completion of the residence remains at ninety days. The
Notice also provides that any debt incurred to acquire the interest of a former
spouse incident to a divorce will also qualify as residential debt.
If the taxpayer borrows funds to purchase a residence as well as other
property, the part of the loan that is allocated to the residence can qualify as
acquisition indebtedness. 65 The allocation is a factual question. Therefore, the
taxpayer should put herself in a position to prove the reasonableness of the
allocation. Use of a separately negotiated purchase price of the residence or
an allocation based on relative fair market values may be reasonable depend-
ing on the circumstances.
Interest paid on debt treated as acquisition debt is deductible regardless
of the source of the loan. Therefore, money borrowed from a pension plan can
qualify as acquisition debt.66 However, the interest deduction can be disal-
62. Id.
63. Lawler v. Commissioner, TC Memo 1995-26.
64. 1988-2 CB 385.
65. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-49-086 (Sept. 14, 1989).
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lowed by other provisions of the Code that override § 163. Therefore, the
interest deduction may be disallowed by I.R.C. § 72(p)(3) for loans made to
key employees even if it meets all the requirements of § 163.
In addition to being incurred to acquire the residence, the Code requires
that the debt be secured by the property. Since this requirement is contained
in the Code, it will be strictly enforced. 67 For example, a debt allocated to the
purchase of the home under Reg. § 1.163-8T will not be treated as acquisition
indebtedness if the residence does not secure the debt. 68 On the other hand,
if the requirements are otherwise met, the debt qualifies as residential debt
regardless of other financial arrangements. For example, the fact that the
creditor requires additional security in addition to the residence will not vio-
late the security requirement. 69 The loan will still qualify as acquisition in-
debtedness.
In Rev. Rul. 92-91,7°the I.R.S. considered another potentially problem-
atic financial arrangement. The Ruling addresses the deductibility of inter-
est on an adjustable rate mortgage when the creditor has accidentally over-
charged the taxpayer. The Ruling holds that the interest is deductible when
paid and is included in income under the 'tax benefit' rule when returned to
the taxpayer. The return can be in cash or a reduction in the principal balance
of the loan. The Ruling leaves unanswered the question of the character of the
income reported - that is, whether it is investment income under § 163(d).
Logically, it cannot be considered investment income, but an argument could
be made that if interest on a tax refund is investment income because a true
investment is not necessary, this amount should also be included in investment
income. This argument is subject to a challenge on the ground that interest
income from any source is different from the refund of an expense overpay-
ment.
Acquisition indebtedness is debt incurred to acquire a residence and the
debt is then secured by the property. Reg. § 1.163-1OT(O)(5) permits a tax-
payer to elect to treat qualified debt as non-acquisition debt. This election is
effective for the tax year of the election and all subsequent tax years, unless
the I.R.S. grants permission to revoke the election. In those cases in which the
election is made, the interest ceases to be qualified residence interest. De-
pending on the use of the proceeds, the interest may become investment in-
terest. For example, the I.R.S. has privately ruled on a situation where the
proceeds of the debt were loaned to a partnership that owned rental property.7
67. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-06-031 (Nov. 10, 1988).
68. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-18-001 (Nov. 5, 1993).
69. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-49-086 (Sept. 14, 1989) and Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-38-023 (Jan. 22,
1990).
70. 1992-2 CB 49 (illustrating the calculation of amount to be included in income).
71. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-35-043
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In this Ruling, the Service concluded that the interest was investment inter-
est. Another interesting question arises if the proceeds are invested in the resi-
dence itself. Can the taxpayer argue that although the property is her home,
it was purchased with the anticipation of future capital gain and therefore the
interest is investment interest? Under § 163(d), investment interest is inter-
est accrued on property held for investment. Investment property is property
not used in a trade or business and which generates portfolio income. It would
appear that a residence could meet this definition of investment property.
Taxpayers should consider the election for the amount of debt that ex-
ceeds the maximum dollar amount contained in § 163. If the elected interest
is reclassified as personal interest, the taxpayer is no worse off, and if it is
reclassified as investment interest, she is better off. Even if the interest is not
currently deductible because of insufficient investment income, the election
would be beneficial to the taxpayer since excess investment interest expense
can be carried forward and deducted in a subsequent year, whereas debt that
exceeds the § 163 limit generates interest that is not deductible.
5. Alternative Minimum Tax
Section 163(h) defines the term qualifying residence as the taxpayer's
principal residence and a second residence. As previously discussed, the
second residence can include boats and housetrailers provided they have
sleeping and cooking accommodations. An individual's interest expense
deduction is also limited for purposes of the alternative minimum tax (AMT).
An individual's itemized deduction for interest for purposes of the alter-
native minimum tax is limited to qualified housing interest.72 This term is
defined to include the taxpayer's principal residence and one other qualified
dwelling used as a residence.7 3 A qualified dwelling is defined as a house,
apartment, condominium or mobile home not used on a transient basis.74
Thus, the second residence for AMT purposes is more limited than the one for
regular tax purposes. It does not include boats and housetrailers. There are
no regulations or other precedents that elaborate on the list of items that are
either included or excluded from this definition. It would appear that the
AMT attempts to limit the deduction to buildings that are permanently at-
tached to land. For those taxpayers that own a second home and a yacht or
other mobile facility with sleeping accommodations, the AMT might dictate
which of the two is selected as the second residence. Although there is noth-
ing in the Code that requires that the second residence for § 163 purposes to
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6. Points
Section 163 permits individuals to deduct some personal interest. The
timing of the deduction is controlled by I.R.C. § 461.
Normally a cash method taxpayer would deduct interest when paid.
However, § 461 (g)(1) states that interest prepaid by a cash method taxpayer
is deductible in the period to which it is allocated. In other words, both cash
and accrual basis taxpayers treat interest expense in the same manner. Only
the interest actually paid for the period within the tax year is deducted. The
remainder is capitalized and deducted in a future period.
Section 461(g)(2) provides for an exception. Points paid by a cash
method taxpayer "... . in connection with the purchase or improvement of, and
secured by, the principal residence of the taxpayer.. ." shall be deducted when
paid, provided that points are generally charged in the taxpayer's geographic
area and that amount is reasonable for that area. Although this exception was
enacted in 1976, no regulations have been issued. As a result, there has been
considerable litigation and uncertainty concerning this exception.
Section 163 allows an individual to deduct interest for a principal resi-
dence and a second residence. The exception in § 461 (g)(2) for the deduction
of points only applies to a principal residence. Although the section does not
contain a definition of the term, it is reasonable to assume that it is identical
to the definition used in § 163, which is that contained in § 1034. Recently,
the Tax Court addressed one aspect of the definition in Russell.7 5 In this case,
the taxpayer deducted points for a loan on a home used partly as his principal
residence and partly for rental purposes. The court concluded that the points
were deductible since the property was used by the taxpayer as his residence.
The court stated, "There is no exception in section 461 (g) for a principal resi-
dence which is also used (partly or substantially) for rental purposes." Based
on this decision, the taxpayer should be able to deduct points paid on a loan
to purchase a duplex or even a quadplex, provided she uses part of the prop-
erty as her principal residence.
Although the Code uses the term "points," it does not define it. One of
the earliest uses of the term was in Rev. Rul. 67-297.76 This Ruling uses the
term as a synonym for loan origination fees charged by the Veteran's Admin-
istration. The fee was a percentage of the loan proceeds and was charged in
lieu of separate fees for appraisals, notary fees, legal expenses, etc. Since the
points were in lieu of fees, the Ruling concluded that they were not interest
and, therefore, not deductible under § 163.
75. Russel v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1994-96, (U.S. Tax Ct. 1994).
76. 1967-2 CB 87.
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The I.R.S. modified its position in Revenue Rulings 69-18877 and 70-
540.78 In these Rulings, the Service recognized that sometimes a creditor will
charge points which are in fact interest, while at other times the charge is for
services rendered which are not interest. The Rulings concluded that points
charged ".... determined by the lender upon consideration of the factors that
usually dictate an acceptable rate of interest" are deductible interest. There
other charges (or points) that are non-deductible fees.
The distinction is not always clear. Therefore the Service issued Rev.
Proc. 92-1279 in an attempt to provide clarity. The revenue procedure covers
items labeled as "points," "discount points," "loan discount," and "loan origi-
nation fees." In addition to being clearly labeled, the item must:
a) be shown on a uniform settlement statement such as HUD-1;
b) be computed as a percentage of the loan principal;
c) be charged as part of the normal business practice in the community;
d) be paid in connection with the acquisition of the principal residence of
the taxpayer; and
e) be paid by the taxpayer.
To be paid by the taxpayer, she must provide cash that was not borrowed and
is at least equal to the points. The cash can be used for deposit, escrow
amounts, earnest money, or as partial payment of the purchase price.
Rev. Proc. 92-72 was modified by Rev. Proc. 94-27.80 The modification
extends the treatment provided to points paid by the seller, including points
charged to the seller. In these cases, the taxpayer must still provide cash that
is at least equal to the points. In addition, the taxpayer must reduce the pur-
chase price (basis) of the residence by the points paid by the seller and claimed
as a deduction.
Points paid by the taxpayer and not covered by these revenue procedures
are still deductible under § 461, provided that the taxpayer can demonstrate
that they meet the general definition of points. Included in these points are
points paid on loans to improve the principal residence. Although § 461 (g)(2)
applies to loans for both acquisition and improvement, the revenue procedures
only cover acquisition debt. Thus, there is no safe harbor for improvement
loans.
To qualify for the special deduction rule of § 461(g)(2), the points must
be paid by the taxpayer. Shortly after the passage of this provision, a ques-
77. 1969-1 CB 54.
78. 1970-2 CB 101.
79. 1992-1 CB 663.
80. 1994-1 CB 613. The procedure supersedes the modification made by Rev. Proc 92-
12A, 1992-1 CB 664.
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tion arose as to whether points withheld by the creditor on a discounted loan
qualified as points paid. The Tax Court considered this issue in Schubel.s'
The court concluded that discounted points did not so qualify. The court
pointed out that § 461 (g)(2) is an exception to the general rule of § 461 (g)(1).
The general rule only applies to prepaid interest. Since discounted points are
not prepaid, but rather paid when the loan is repaid, they do not come within
the scope of § 461(g)(1) and, therefore, cannot qualify for special treatment
under subsection (g)(2). In effect, the court concluded that § 461(g)(2) did not
change the pre-existing rule that withheld interest is not considered paid. 2
This conclusion with respect to discounted points applies today. For this
reason Rev. Proc. 92-12 and 94-27 require taxpayers to provide cash from
non-borrowed sources in an amount at least equal to the points to qualify for
the safe harbor. It is imperative that taxpayers fulfill this requirement because
if they do not, not only will they not qualify under the revenue procedures, but
also they will not qualify under the general rule of § 461(g)(2) which will re-
sult in a loss of the current deduction for the points.
Section 461(g)(2) allows a deduction for points paid "in connection
with" the purchase or improvement of a principal residence. The scope of the
phrase "in connection with" has been the object of considerable litigation and
discussion for taxpayers who refinance home mortgages. The specific ques-
tion is whether points paid on refinancing a home mortgage can be deducted
under § 4 61(g)(2).
The government's position is spelled out in Rev. Rul. 87-22.83 Section
461(g)(2) only applies to the purchase or improvement of a principal resi-
dence. Funds used for any other purpose do not qualify. A refinancing loan
is used to pay off a prior debt and not to purchase a new residence. Therefore,
the points are not eligible for this special treatment.84 If the refinancing not
only repays an existing loan, but funds an improvement to the residence, the
portion of the points allocated to the funds used for the improvement can be
deducted under § 461(g)(2).
In Huntsman81 the taxpayer argued that Rev. Rul. 87-22 is incorrect and
that the phrase "in connection with" is broad enough to encompass refinanc-
ing. In this case, the taxpayer paid points of $4,440 to refinance a three year
81. Schubel v. Commissioner, 77 TC 701 (1981).
82. See Rubnitz v. Commissioner, 67 TC 621 (1977) and Anover Realty Corp. v.
Commissioner, 33 TC 677 (1960).
83. 87-1 CB 146.
84. The conclusion is based on a quote from the Committee reports to the 1976 Bill which
states that proceeds used for purposes other than purchase or improvement of a home do not
qualify.
85. Huntsman v. Commissioner, 91 TC 917 (1998).
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balloon note with a 30-year mortgage. A majority of the Tax Court decided
that the taxpayer's interpretation was incorrect. In a footnote, the court left
open the possibility that refinancing of a construction or bridge loan might
come within the meaning of "in connection with."
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Tax Court.8 6 The
Eighth Circuit felt that the phrase "in connection with" should be interpreted
broadly. To meet this test, the expenditure need only be in "association with"
or "related" to the purchase of a residence. To deny all refinancing would in
effect replace the "in connection with" phrase with a "directly related to the
purchase" requirement. In Huntsman, the taxpayer's replacement of a 3-year
balloon note with a 30-year mortgage is "in connection with" the purchase of
the residence and, therefore, eligible for treatment under § 461(g)(2).
The decision in Huntsman appears to adopt the Tax Court decision rather
than overrule it. If the taxpayer is refinancing a construction or bridge loan,
it can be considered in connection with the purchase of the residence. If the
taxpayer is refinancing a long-term mortgage with another long-term mort-
gage to reduce the interest rate, it will not qualify as being in connection with
the purchase. Although most construction loans are self-evident, the length
of a qualifying bridge loan has yet to be decided.
In 1991, the I.R.S. issued an 'Action on Decision' on Huntsman. In this
pronouncement, the Service decided not to request certiorari due to an ab-
sence of conflict in the circuits, but rather to maintain the position that refi-
nancing does not qualify for § 461(g)(2) in all circuits other than the Eighth.
In Fort Howard Corporation,7 the Tax Court was asked to reconsider its
decision in Huntsman. After reviewing the facts, the court found that the loan
in Fort Howard was a construction/bridge loan. The court therefore felt that
the current case did not require a reconsideration of their prior decision. By
refusing to reconsider its prior decision, the Tax Court appeared to endorse the
conclusion of the Eighth Circuit that certain limited refinancing can qualify
under § 4 61(g)(2). The real difference appears to be in the definition of the
terms "construction" and "bridge" loans. The Court of Appeals felt that
Huntsman refinanced a bridge loan whereas the Tax Court felt differently. It
is reasonable to assume that there will be additional litigation on this issue.
Section 461 (g)(2) allows an immediate deduction for points. For points
paid in connection with loans whose interest is deductible under § 163, but not
currently deductible under § 4 61 (g)(2), the points must be amortized over the
life of the loan. The general rules for computation are contained in I.R.C.
§ 1272(a) and require amortization based on economic accrual of the points
86. 905 F.2d 1182 (8th Cir. 1990).
87. 103 TC 345 (1994).
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as if they were an original issue discount. To ease the burden on taxpayers,
Rev. Proc. 87-1588 provides a short cut method for certain taxpayers. Under
this revenue procedure, the points may be allocated ratably over the loan
period. To use this revenue procedure, the following condition must be met:
1. the borrower is an individual;
2. she uses the cash method of accounting;
3. the loan period does not exceed thirty years; and
4. if the loan term exceeds ten years, then
a) the principal cannot exceed $250,000 or
b) the points are four or less for fifteen years on shorter loans and six
or less for longer loans.
The use of the revenue procedure not only simplifies the computation, but also
accelerates part of the deduction. Therefore, it should be used when available.
E. Conclusion
Section 163(d) disallows a deduction for most personal interest. There
is an exception for interest incurred in a trade or business. For this purpose,
an employee is not considered engaged a trade or business. Recent decisions
have held that loans to buy stock are not business, but rather investment, loans
regardless of taxpayer's motive, whereas loans to buy an interest in a pass-
through entity may generate deductible business interest.
The law allows individuals to deduct investment interest. It also allows
taxpayers to increase this limit by electing to treat capital gains as investment
income. To the extent the taxpayer makes this election, the gain is ineligible
for the reduced capital gain tax rate. In most cases, taxpayers should not make
this election.
The law also allows a deduction of interest on taxpayers' residences.
This can include contiguous land purchased after, but used as part of, the
residence purchase. Taxpayers can elect to treat the debt on a second resi-
dence as qualifying or elect to treat otherwise qualifying debt as non-residen-
tial debt. If taxpayers incur points to purchase the residence, the points may
currently be deducted. There is a conflict as to the deductibility of points paid
on a refinancing.
With proper planning taxpayers can maximize this deduction. However,
many questions remain unanswered.
88. 1987-1 CB 624.
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